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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-1798
___________
VAMSIDHAR REDDY VURIMINDI,
Appellant
v.
WYETH PHARMACEUTICALS, (PFIZER); ACCENTURE; MEDFOCUS;
STEPHEN KOPKO; ROBERT MOYER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-00386)
District Judge: Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 11, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 12, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
In December 2009, Appellant, Vamsidhar Vurimindi, commenced this
action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against defendants Wyeth
Pharmaceuticals (Pfizer), MedFocus (Inventive Clinical Solutions), Accenture, Stephen
Kopko and Robert Moyer. In the complaint, Vurimindi, who had worked with the
1

defendants in various capacities, claimed that they had violated the Civil Rights Act of
1964 by harassing him, sabotaging his work, and conspiring to tarnish his reputation.
The complaint also included several state-law tort claims. The defendants subsequently
removed the complaint to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
In August 2010, Vurimindi filed an amended complaint asserting the same
federal claims as well as the following state-law claims against the defendants: breach of
contract, wrongful termination, slander, fraud and misrepresentation, invasion of privacy,
and interference with economic relationship. Soon thereafter, the defendants moved to
dismiss the amended complaint on various grounds. Vurimindi then sought leave to
amend the complaint a second time in order to withdraw his federal claims and assert
additional state-law claims.1
By order entered March 23, 2011, the District Court dismissed the amended
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that, because Vurimindi
consented to withdraw his federal claims, it no longer had federal question jurisdiction
over the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and could not otherwise retain original
jurisdiction because diversity of citizenship was lacking, see id. § 1332. The court
recognized that it had the authority to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims, see id. § 1367, but determined that doing so would not serve any “useful
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Specifically, Vurimindi sought leave to assert claims for promissory estoppel and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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purpose.” Therefore, the court dismissed the amended complaint and denied Vurimindi
leave to file a second amended complaint asserting additional state-law claims.
Vurimindi now appeals from the District Court’s order.2
We will affirm. The District Court properly concluded that, because
Vurimindi withdrew his federal claims,3 it no longer possessed subject matter jurisdiction
over the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Moreover, the court acted within its discretion in
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims,
including those presented in the proposed second amended complaint. See Borough of
West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]here the claim over
which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court
must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for
doing so.”) The matter is remanded to the District Court with directions that the case be
returned to state court.
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We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Although Vurimindi includes in his brief argument in support of his federal civil
rights claims, his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint makes clear that
he intended to withdraw those claims.
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